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This special issue of the Asia Colloquia Papers examines 
some of the diverse issues that confront Taiwan in the 
context of changing global and Asia-Pacifi c regional order. 
The papers, wriƩ en by senior students who parƟ cipated in 
a May 2012 study trip to Taiwan, look at such topics as the 
role of educaƟ on in indigenous peoples’ self-determinaƟ on 
in Taiwan and Canada; evolving China-Taiwan relaƟ ons and 
their mulƟ ple implicaƟ ons; changing migraƟ on paƩ erns in 
Taiwan in the context of contemporary globalizaƟ on; and new 
developments in Taiwan’s role as an aid donor in Africa.
The students presented their papers to Taiwan audiences 
during a study tour as part of the Young Leaders DelegaƟ on 
programme sponsored by the Ministry of Foreign Aff airs of 
Taiwan, the Republic of China. The Young Leaders DelegaƟ on 
programme aims to introduce senior university students from 
abroad to contemporary Taiwan and its complex challenges. 
Indigenous EducaƟ on in Taiwan and Canada: We Are All     
Related
Indigenous peoples of Taiwan have experienced centuries 
of colonialism that conƟ nue to resonate in the lived experi-
ences of individuals, families and communiƟ es. The disƟ nct 
and complex history of Taiwan shares common threads with 
Indigenous naƟ ons across the world, grounding social move-
ments for legal recogniƟ on and community well-being. These 
movements are driven by goals of self-determinaƟ on with par-
Ɵ cular emphasis on educaƟ on. In September 2012 the World 
Indigenous NaƟ ons Higher EducaƟ on ConsorƟ um (WINHEC) 
gathered for their annual meeƟ ng and research conference 
at NaƟ onal Dong Hwa University, Taiwan. At this gathering 
Indigenous educators and researchers from across the world 
came together to share their struggles and successes, weav-
ing worldviews and histories with respect for one another. 
Of parƟ cular interest at this gathering was the raƟ fi caƟ on of 
WINHEC accreditaƟ on for Shingwauk Kinoomaage Gamig, an 
Anishinabe culture-based university in Northern Ontario. I 
have had the honour of being a student, a helper and most 
recently a teacher-in-training at Shingwauk Kinoomaage Gamig 
while compleƟ ng my Masters degree in Language, Culture and 
Teaching at York University.
 When I came upon the announcement that York was 
sending students to parƟ cipate in a Young Leaders DelegaƟ on 
to Taiwan, I knew I wanted to be there. I had been working 
with an amazing team at Shingwauk Kinoomaage Gamig to 
achieve accreditaƟ on with WINHEC. This accreditaƟ on is far 
more meaningful than Ontario or Canada’s legislated proce-
dures, as the WINHEC organizaƟ on is a self-determining body 
comprised of representaƟ ves from Indigenous naƟ ons across 
the world. I knew that the upcoming meeƟ ng and confer-
ence would be in Taiwan. I knew that Shingwauk Kinoomaage 
Gamig would be there to reach an incredible landmark. I knew 
that the study trip would provide me with an opportunity to 
learn more about Taiwan and its history. It would create the 
space to share our story, to understand how it connects to 
the stories in Taiwan. In many ways it helped to prepare us at 
Shingwauk Kinoomaage Gamig for the September 2012 confer-
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ence.
 In the original paper wriƩ en for the Young Leaders Del-
egaƟ on to Taiwan, I explored the history and present context 
of Indigenous educaƟ on in Taiwan in the context of growing 
threats to the well-being of land and community in the name 
of “development”. I examined the recent history of Indigenous 
social movements in Taiwan as a means through which naƟ ons 
have achieved signifi cant change to further their self-deter-
minaƟ on. It became clear to me that the Indigenous naƟ ons 
of Taiwan—made up of at least 20 groups based on linguisƟ c 
diff erences (Pawa 2004: 26) and comprising approximately two 
percent of the overall populaƟ on (Wu 2012: 3)—hold educa-
Ɵ on as a high priority for the well-being of their people. The 
recent history of Indigenous educaƟ on in Taiwan is very similar 
to what Indigenous peoples in Canada have faced. In contrast 
to the mainstream populaƟ on, Indigenous people in Taiwan 
have generally low aƩ ainment (Lee et al. 2011: 62) and high 
drop-out rates (Chou and Yen 2007: 73). It is widely idenƟ -
fi ed that most teachers in Taiwan are not Indigenous and lack 
cultural competency and sensiƟ vity (ibid.: 76; Lee et al. 2011: 
61; Tsou 2010: 65). Course content and teaching methods 
predominantly exclude Indigenous language and knowledge 
(Chou and Yen 2007: 86; Tsou 2010: 65; Wu 2012: 2) and 
further serve to perpetuate harmful stereotypes which set up 
Indigenous people as “stupid,” “savage,” “alcoholics” and so on 
(Chou and Yen 2007: 87). In Canada, the state of Indigenous 
educaƟ on is very much the same. Schooling has served the 
purposes of colonizing and civilizing.
 This recent history is understood and recognized by 
Indigenous people. It is through this recogniƟ on that change 
movements emerged in both Canada (in the late 1960s) and 
Taiwan (in the late 1970s). People organized, they arƟ culated 
their needs and as naƟ ons put forward clear agendas for the 
well-being of their communiƟ es into the future. The promo-
Ɵ on of Indigenous rights and legal recogniƟ on was intertwined 
with an educaƟ on that supported the preservaƟ on and nur-
turing of Indigenous languages, histories and worldviews. The 
eff orts of Indigenous social movements led to consƟ tuƟ onal 
reforms, creaƟ on or adaptaƟ on of law (e.g., amendments to 
The Indian Act in Canada and the creaƟ on of the Indigenous 
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EducaƟ on Act in Taiwan). It also led to the establishment of In-
digenous controlled educaƟ onal projects for all ages. It led to 
the development of Shingwauk Kinoomaage Gamig in Bawat-
ing (Sault Ste. Marie, Ontario) and to the College of Indigenous 
Studies at NaƟ onal Dong Hwa University, Taiwan. It led to the 
gathering that took place in September 2012; it brought Indig-
enous insƟ tuƟ ons and Indigenous naƟ ons together to share 
common experiences and to liŌ  each other up in what they 
have achieved. We can feel the Ɵ me that we are in, a Ɵ me of 
change that was prophesied by our ancestors. The connec-
Ɵ ons across naƟ ons are resurfacing. Our CreaƟ on Stories, our 
philosophies, our ways of living in the world remind us that we 
are all related.
 While my visit to Taiwan was very short, I learned so 
much. I shared my brief paper on Indigenous educaƟ on in Tai-
wan with university students and various people involved with 
the Ministry of Foreign Aff airs. There was some discomfort in 
speaking about other peoples and naƟ ons, but I soon real-
ized that many of these students and diplomats had not heard 
this history before. There was signifi cant interest in my paper, 
but I found there was even greater interest in learning about 
my experience and more broadly about Indigenous people in 
Canada. I shared my experience openly and with pride. It is 
only through my experiences with culture-based educaƟ on at 
Shingwauk Kinoomaage Gamig that I can speak clearly of my 
story and our story as Anishinabe people. As Indigenous edu-
caƟ on projects and insƟ tuƟ ons grow, there will be more of us 
who can stand up and speak. This will ensure our naƟ ons will 
be strong. This will ensure that we survive.
Taiwan and Africa’s Development
The Republic of China on Taiwan’s (ROC) unique posiƟ on in 
the internaƟ onal community has required it to reach out for 
supporters throughout the world, including on the African 
conƟ nent. In the past, the ROC has been criƟ cized for its use of 
“dollar diplomacy” to earn allies. The necessity of change was 
acknowledged by President Ma Ying-jeou in 2008 with his em-
phasis on “viable diplomacy”. This model seeks to emphasize 
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“dignity, autonomy, pragmaƟ sm, and fl exibility” in foreign rela-
Ɵ ons dealings in the eff ort to improve Taiwan’s internaƟ onal 
image (Offi  ce of the President, Republic of China 2012).
However, the ROC’s policies, especially towards Africa, are 
notable for several reasons: their unique power balance with 
African states, the emphasis on localized and indigenous de-
velopment policies, and the focus on poorer states. Firstly, the 
relaƟ onship between Taiwan and its African supporters should 
not be characterized as one of a patron and client. There is ex-
tensive literature that characterizes the aid-donor relaƟ onship 
with signifi cant aƩ enƟ on being paid to western donors such 
as the United States. R.D. McKinley, an infl uenƟ al scholar on 
bilateral aid policies, highlights that the relaƟ onship between 
the donor and recipient state can be characterized as asym-
metrical. The donor can terminate aid with no or liƩ le cost to 
themselves, while the recipient remains dependent on foreign 
providers (McKinley 1979: 413).
 The ROC’s relaƟ onship with its African aid recipients, 
however, does not fi t in this model. For the ROC, poliƟ cal 
support is a maƩ er of “poliƟ cal life and death”. It depends 
on African states for advocacy in the internaƟ onal sphere 
(ibid.: 382). In its search for internaƟ onal recogniƟ on, the ROC 
recognizes that Africa is not an insignifi cant region, as it repre-
sents one-third of the United NaƟ ons General Assembly. As a 
result, the donor-recipient relaƟ onship idenƟ fi ed by McKinley 
becomes complicated; the so-called weaker recipient African 
naƟ ons have an important source of infl uence within interna-
Ɵ onal relaƟ ons and they should not be viewed as “subjects” 
of Taiwan. AddiƟ onally, the unique power balance between 
the ROC and its African partners is evident in the tendency of 
states to use compeƟ Ɵ on between the ROC and the People’s 
Republic of China (PRC) for their benefi t (Baker and Edmonds 
2004: 191). This compeƟ Ɵ on allows African elites to play the 
compeƟ tors off  against one another, thereby increasing the 
amount of fi nancial and technical support they are provided 
(Taylor 2002: 130). It is the recipient, not the donor, who is in 
a posiƟ on of relaƟ ve power. Although various individuals with 
whom we interacted during the Young Leaders DelegaƟ on 
study trip expressed confi dence in “viable diplomacy”, there 
is no signifi cant research on the impact of this policy on these 
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power relaƟ ons.
 Secondly, the aid relaƟ onship between Taiwan and 
Africa is marked by an increasing emphasis on local projects 
and overall eff ecƟ veness. In the 1960s and 1970s, Taipei’s as-
sistance plans were marked by temporary “green miracles”, 
needing “short-term results more desperately” than other aid 
providers. In contrast, Taipei’s contemporary policies focus on 
case-by-case soluƟ ons and more pracƟ cal assistance (Liu 2009: 
399). Taipei has built a reputaƟ on in Africa for off ering appro-
priate technological support with few strings aƩ ached (Taylor 
2002: 131). Furthermore, the Taipei Times reports that Taipei 
is turning its focus to a greater emphasis on projects that train 
and empower indigenous groups (“Strengthening Ties with 
Africa,” Taipei Times, May 8, 2012). Although Taipei’s poliƟ -
cal moƟ vaƟ ons are explicit, there remains a desire to be what 
President Ma highlights as “an internaƟ onal asset rather than 
a liability by contribuƟ ng to internaƟ onal assistance programs” 
(Anonymous 2012: 19475b). The ROC’s contemporary devel-
opment projects are noteworthy because of their emphasis on 
development needs and long-term success.
 For example, the ROC has remained commiƩ ed to 
providing assistance to The Gambia, parƟ cularly agricultural 
technical assistance. Its current projects there, including 
vegetable gardening programs near Banjul and a Ɵ dal rice 
irrigaƟ on scheme near Sapu, minimize the use of complex 
technology and rely on methods that can be maintained by lo-
cal populaƟ ons (Baker and Edmonds 2004: 192). Furthermore, 
the project seeks to engage marginalized groups such as local 
women, and, as a result, the excellent record of the Taiwanese 
government “is well acknowledged at every level of Gambian 
society” (ibid.: 207). Contemporary ROC development assis-
tance focuses on long-term project goals and engages with 
people at a variety of levels of African society, thus providing 
empowerment.
 Finally, Taipei’s development assistance policies to-
wards Africa can be characterized as targeƟ ng the poorest 
countries. Literature acknowledges this tendency in the ROC’s 
foreign policy, agreeing that its infl uence is limited to states 
that will not be crippled by a loss of trade relaƟ ons with the 
PRC (Taylor 2002: 130; Payne and Veney 2001: 447). The ROC 
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has the greatest poliƟ cal leverage in these states. However, 
scholarship tends to minimize the reality that many of these 
states have the highest need for assistance. For example, four 
of the states that recognize the ROC are São Tomé e Principe, 
Swaziland, The Gambia and Burkina Faso. Of the 187 countries 
on the United NaƟ ons Development Program’s Human Devel-
opment Index, these four are ranked noƟ ceably low: São Tomé 
e Principe at 144, Swaziland at 140, The Gambia at 168, and 
Burkina Faso at 181 (United NaƟ ons Development Program 
2012). All four of these states can be considered least devel-
oped countries. It is important to emphasize substanƟ al needs 
in these states and the empowerment that has come through 
projects such as the previously menƟ oned agricultural ven-
tures in The Gambia.
 Moving forward, the ROC’s internaƟ onal development 
schema will face, among others challenges, two in parƟ cular. 
Firstly, the ROC will likely face diffi  culƟ es in pracƟ cally applying 
its “viable diplomacy”, as do other governments distribuƟ ng 
a form of overseas development assistance. More research 
should be done, however, to examine the ways in which the 
ROC’s nuanced relaƟ onship with Africa, as discussed previ-
ously, creates unique challenges. Secondly, greater aƩ enƟ on 
is being given to Africa by the PRC, and these changing cir-
cumstances will likely aff ect Taiwan’s aid policies. As Payne 
and Veney (2001: 441) note, “Whereas the West has decided 
to marginalize most African countries, China has increased its 
diplomaƟ c and economic acƟ viƟ es on the conƟ nent”. It will be 
important to examine the impact of both the viable diplomacy 
policy and the increasing interest of the PRC in Africa on the 
ROC’s internaƟ onal development policies in Africa.
MigraƟ on and Taiwan’s Economic Development: IlluminaƟ ng 
the MulƟ scalar Impacts of GlobalizaƟ on
In response to migraƟ on specialist Doreen Massey’s appeal 
for a contemporary migraƟ on theory for the post-industrial 
climate (de Haas, 2008: 48), renowned sociologist Stephen 
Castles describes migraƟ on as predominantly a “social trans-
formaƟ on” indicaƟ ng the “complexity, interconnectedness, 
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variability, contextuality, and mulƟ -level mediaƟ ons of global 
change” (2010: 1566). Hence, the rise of Taiwan as a global 
player in informaƟ on technology subsequently culƟ vates a 
divergence in tradiƟ onal Asian labour migraƟ on paƩ erns. 
What does this mean for our understanding of the relaƟ onship 
between migraƟ on and economic globalizaƟ on in Taiwan?
From the mid-twenƟ eth century onwards, the Taiwan govern-
ment culƟ vated economic development in the Republic of 
China (ROC) through restricƟ ve centralized planning iniƟ aƟ ves. 
Internal economic incubaƟ on was consolidated by prohibi-
Ɵ ve immigraƟ on policies yielding immense economic gains. 
However, the disbanding of marƟ al law in 1987 insƟ gated 
massive migraƟ on policy reform, including opening Taiwan to 
temporary foreign workers in 1992 (Lin 2012). The impacts 
of this deregulaƟ on have been contested amongst scholars. 
Lin idenƟ fi es this period as a “key era of migraƟ on transiƟ on” 
(ibid.: n.p.)—internally and internaƟ onally—wrought by the 
repercussions of Taiwan’s poliƟ cal liberalizaƟ on. His analysis 
solidifi es the causal relaƟ onship between economic develop-
ment and migraƟ on policies. Pang’s (1993) model provides 
further evidence for the linking of economic development with 
migraƟ on transiƟ on in Taiwan (cited by Findlay, 1998: 645). 
Further, geographer Anand Segal and his coauthors (2010: 
335) argue that the globalizaƟ on and internaƟ onalizaƟ on of 
the Taiwan economy infl uenced the decision by the govern-
ment to respond with a more liberalized immigraƟ on policy. As 
Castles (2010) emphasizes, migraƟ on serves as a key indicator 
of Taiwan’s economic vitality. How have post-1987 migraƟ on 
paƩ erns aff ected economic development and prescribed the 
ROC’s socioeconomic milieu, including its spaƟ al and social 
variaƟ ons? 
 Taiwan’s changing migraƟ on policies are a valuable 
lens to understand the unique ways it has both embraced and 
resisted the forces of globalizaƟ on. The diverse impacts of 
globalizaƟ on are best encapsulated through three emergent 
trends occurring consequenƟ ally from changing migraƟ on poli-
cies on economic development locally, regionally and naƟ on-
ally. 
 ContrasƟ ng immigrant fl ows to Taipei with the rest of 
the ROC reveals the changing socioeconomic condiƟ ons there 
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and the increasing gulf between Taiwan’s largest metropolis 
and the rest of the Republic—reinforced by an infl ux of for-
eign residents. The eff ects of globalizaƟ on are most salient in 
Taipei. Tai Po-Fen (2006) considers Taipei a generaƟ ve context 
for analyzing the interplay among the following factors: the 
interdependent relaƟ onship between economic and cultural 
globalizaƟ on, the rise of Taiwan’s high-tech industry and the 
migratory streams propelled by structural economic shiŌ s. By 
2001, 32 percent of all industrial, commercial and service fi rms 
were concentrated in Taipei, generaƟ ng 43 percent of Taiwan’s 
total producƟ ve value. Therefore, as Lin (2012) argues, busi-
ness cycles directly aff ect immigraƟ on fl ows from Japan and 
the United States. The return migraƟ on of educated Taiwan-
ese and the sizable fl ow of Japanese and American business 
people due to policies of “greater openness to professionals 
and highly skilled foreign workers” have successfully provided 
Taiwan with the necessary resources to “meet the challenges 
of a compeƟ Ɵ ve world economy in the era of globalizaƟ on” 
(Wongboosin 2003: 84).
 Indeed, this assessment reveals the unique way in 
which Taipei’s sophisƟ cated economic structure embodies 
Saskia Sassen’s defi niƟ on of a “global city” (a command and 
control centre characterized by its transnaƟ onal infl uences 
[Wang 2003]) and the subsequent ramifi caƟ ons of this new 
urban persona. Tai (2006) encapsulates this reality of Taipei as 
a “dual city”, one characterized by bifurcated social classes—a 
cosmopolitan, internaƟ onal elite and a low-skilled, disposable 
urban underclass of predominantly foreign contract work-
ers. Parallel with Taipei’s doubling of skilled expatriates from 
1990-1995 (Findlay 1998: 654) was the populaƟ on increase of 
unskilled foreign labourers to 39,790 in 2003 from a level of 
1,667 in 1992 (Tai 2006). NaƟ onals are no longer willing to per-
form “3D” jobs–dirty, dangerous and demeaning, and South 
Asian labourers are recruited as insecure contract workers for 
these roles (Findlay 1998). Consequently, social polarizaƟ on–a 
problem foreign to this city before 1990–has become increas-
ingly pernicious; the precarious posiƟ on of most foreign mi-
grants in Taiwan affi  rms Tai’s asserƟ on that “immigrant work-
ers generate new urban divisions” (2006: 1754). 
 Analyzing how these policies have changed tradiƟ onal 
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internal migraƟ on paƩ erns will elucidate forces prescribing 
diff erenƟ al regional economic development. In describing the 
“migrant displacement” phenomena occurring in northern Tai-
wan, Lin (2012) notes the loss of low-skilled domesƟ c work in 
certain areas and the negaƟ ve eff ect of this for the socioeco-
nomic well-being of the local populaƟ on. One must assess the 
negaƟ ve consequences of decreased remiƩ ances and returned 
revenues to rural areas rather than dismissing this trend as 
merely a “fl ight caused by increased immigraƟ on” (Lin 2012). 
Resources are concentrated in Taipei—compromising the tra-
diƟ onal rural-to-urban migraƟ on cycle that ensured conƟ nual 
economic survival in rural communiƟ es. The economic success 
that Taiwan has incurred by migraƟ on obfuscates the negaƟ ve 
impacts these trends and relevant policies have had on much 
of the populaƟ on. 
 The liberalizaƟ on of migrant controls, changing pat-
terns in the country of origin of migrant workers, and demo-
graphic and economic disparity between Taipei and the rest of 
the ROC elucidate the unique trajectory Taiwan has pursued in 
integraƟ ng into the globalized economy. DeregulaƟ ng migra-
Ɵ on controls has allowed the ROC to successfully preserve 
the central tenets of its centralized economic regime, thus 
retrofi ƫ  ng their centralized “Asian Tiger” paradigm to saƟ sfy a 
globalized context. As Han EnƟ zinger explains, “Taiwan’s deci-
sion to open up channels for labour migraƟ on must therefore 
be perceived as an aƩ empt to defend economic naƟ onalism 
in the face of a globalized economy” (2004: 106). Therefore, 
a paradox is revealed: to prevent the off shore relocaƟ on of 
Taiwan companies, the government relies on foreign labour 
to recƟ fy the domesƟ c labour shortage. This strategy accords 
maximum economic benefi ts to the ROC at minimal social 
costs (EnƟ zinger 2004); temporary foreign workers do not 
require cultural, social or economic integraƟ on. Thus, Taiwan 
acts globally while ensuring a vibrant naƟ onal economy and 
a relaƟ vely culturally homogenous naƟ onal populaƟ on. How-
ever, in the mid-2000s, the government announced plans to 
issue permanent resident permits to many of the 46,000 long-
term resident aliens (Wongboosin 2003). This new trajectory 
complicates the formerly Ɵ dy arrangement of cheap, interna-
Ɵ onal, disposable labour bringing economic gain. It will have 
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ROC. 
 UlƟ mately, Taiwan’s contemporary migraƟ on policy 
shiŌ  affi  rms that “migraƟ on refl ects a highly structured system 
of movement fundamentally linked to Taiwan’s posiƟ on in the 
global economy” (Findlay, 1998: 656). These paƩ erns reveal 
Taiwan’s economic globalizaƟ on has preserved the govern-
ment’s interests and ensured enduring naƟ onal economic con-
trol. Taiwan’s dynamic economic and social transformaƟ ons 
present an important case study that off ers insights into the 
highly intricate and complex relaƟ onship between economic 
development and migraƟ on.
CooperaƟ on over Confl ict: Can Economic IntegraƟ on Help 
MiƟ gate the Chances of Chinese and Taiwanese Confl ict?
 
What is perceived to be the real possibility of military confl ict 
between China and Taiwan has threatened peace and stabil-
ity in East Asia for decades. Taiwan is de facto an independent 
and sovereign state with its own government and military, yet 
its status as such remains unrecognized by all but 23 of the 
world’s states and governments (Winkler 2011). It is presently 
refused membership in numerous internaƟ onal organizaƟ ons, 
such as the United NaƟ ons (Tien and Tung 2011: 80). This is 
due in large part to Chinese government pressure for other 
states and intergovernmental organizaƟ ons to withhold rec-
ogniƟ on of Taiwan as a prerequisite for maintaining relaƟ ons 
with the People’s Republic of China (PRC) (ibid.). In addiƟ on 
to this diplomaƟ c pressure, since 1949, successive Chinese 
governments have insisted that Taiwan is an inalienable part of 
the Chinese state that must, at some point, be reunifi ed with 
mainland China. Termed the “one-China principle”, this stance 
that the Republic of China ([ROC], used interchangeably here 
with “Taiwan”) is not a legiƟ mate state, is bolstered by the 
posiƟ on of the PRC government. It maintains that should Tai-
wan ever formally declare independence, the PRC government 
would invade (ibid.).1  
 This paper will employ what internaƟ onal relaƟ ons (IR) 
theory refers to as a liberal-pluralist framework, focusing spe-
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cifi cally on interdependency theory and liberal insƟ tuƟ onalism 
to support the arguments made (see Burchill 2009). Given this 
theoreƟ cal lens, the 2010 Economic CooperaƟ on Framework 
Agreement (ECFA) and the associated economic China-Taiwan 
links it is fostering will be examined as an insƟ tuƟ onal mecha-
nism to deter military confl ict. Finally, the ability of increasing 
economic linkages and insƟ tuƟ onalized interacƟ on to resolve 
or more completely transform the current state of relaƟ ons 
between China and Taiwan will be considered. Though it is ad-
miƩ edly early days for ECFA, this paper will argue that growing 
interdependence and insƟ tuƟ onalized relaƟ ons between China 
and Taiwan will serve to miƟ gate the possibility of military con-
fl ict between the two territories, assuming the government of 
Taiwan does not unilaterally declare full independence.
The trade and economic links fostered between China and 
Taiwan due to ECFA build a foundaƟ on for cooperaƟ on beyond 
the 1992 consensus. They also provide a means to reduce the 
possibility of armed confl ict, in line with the predicƟ ons of 
interdependency and insƟ tuƟ onalist theory. In 2008, when the 
Chinese and Taiwanese governments established offi  cial trans-
port and economic linkages between their respecƟ ve locales, 
it became evident that, increasingly, there were economic 
incenƟ ves for peace. The two territories then negoƟ ated ECFA, 
which came into eff ect in 2010 and had helped cross-strait 
trade grow to US $152 billion in the same year by eliminaƟ ng 
tariff s on numerous goods (Brown 2011). Avenues have also 
opened for increased investment by Chinese people in the 
Taiwan economy and vice versa (Tien and Tung 2011: 81).
 There are already some early indicaƟ ons that ECFA is 
contribuƟ ng to a more peaceful relaƟ onship. Members of the 
Chinese and Taiwanese governments have noted how ECFA is 
expanding on the mutual trust created from the 1992 con-
sensus (Wang 2012). Moreover, ECFA is facilitaƟ ng increased 
“cross-strait exchange and collaboraƟ on in capital, work force, 
management style, technological innovaƟ on, and business cul-
ture,” all of which promote personal and professional linkages 
and discourage anything that would disrupt valuable trade 
relaƟ onships (Chan 2012). AddiƟ onally, this codifi ed agree-
ment serves as a framework for the development of further 
insƟ tuƟ onal arrangements and may, over Ɵ me, serve to re-
Asia Colloquia Papers
12
Vol. 2 No. 2 // November 2012
There are already some 
early indicaƟ ons that ECFA is 
contribuƟ ng to a more peaceful 
relaƟ onship. 
duce the advantages of pursuing military soluƟ ons to potenƟ al 
problems. However, developments of that nature will take 
signifi cant Ɵ me. Currently, ECFA is merely a beginning and too 
new for there to be data suggesƟ ng it is defi niƟ vely reducing 
the possibility of confl ict.
 There are certainly limits to liberal insƟ tuƟ onalist 
theory generally and to ECFA in parƟ cular. Although regimes 
and insƟ tuƟ ons such as EFCA may serve as a mechanism to 
lessen the possibility of armed confl ict, this author would 
never suggest that economic agreements and insƟ tuƟ ons 
necessarily prevent it. If the Taiwanese government was to 
unilaterally declare independence, for example, an event that 
the Chinese government has previously claimed would result 
in confl ict, then the ability of almost any insƟ tuƟ onalized inter-
acƟ on to deter said aƩ ack would be negligible. However, this 
raises the quesƟ on of whether such interacƟ ons might reduce 
or increase the likelihood of such a unilateral declaraƟ on by 
Taiwan or aff ect the Chinese policy that it would respond with 
military force. There is also some concern that as the Taiwan-
ese economy becomes increasingly dependent on the Chinese 
export market, the Chinese government will be able to exert 
undue infl uence over Taiwanese poliƟ cs and through common 
insƟ tuƟ ons. This is parƟ cularly worrying given China is less 
dependent on Taiwan imports than the reverse (Kastner 2006: 
320). That is not to say that asymmetrical economic or poliƟ -
cal infl uence would cause military confl ict, but it could under-
mine the independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity 
of Taiwan, which is also what is at stake when China threatens 
military acƟ on.
 However, those caveats aside, should ECFA, as well 
as other insƟ tuƟ onal frameworks, conƟ nue to foster mutu-
ally benefi cial Ɵ es for the Chinese and Taiwanese govern-
ments while military confl ict is avoided, a strong case could be 
made for iniƟ aƟ ng similar processes to foster insƟ tuƟ onalized 
economic Ɵ es and interdependence in other confl ict zones 
throughout the world, if they are not underway already.
 To conclude, expanding and growing economic links 
and insƟ tuƟ onalized economic relaƟ ons between China and 
Taiwan may be lessening the possibiliƟ es of armed confl ict 
between the two enƟ Ɵ es, presuming that Taiwan does not 
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unilaterally declare independence. This paper examined the 
ECFA agreement through a liberal insƟ tuƟ onalist lens, viewing 
it as an iniƟ al step towards achieving the insƟ tuƟ onal capacity 
to stabilize the relaƟ onship between the governments of China 
and Taiwan. Following the analysis of this specifi c agreement, 
the future implicaƟ ons of the liberal insƟ tuƟ onalist perspec-
Ɵ ve were considered as a way of permanently resolving the 
long-standing issues between the Chinese and Taiwanese 
governments, including diffi  cult quesƟ ons of sovereignty and 
internaƟ onal status related to the “one-China Principle”. Many 
quesƟ ons remain, such as what indicators should be uƟ lized to 
measure a change in the possibility of confl ict and how domes-
Ɵ c poliƟ cs in China and Taiwan aff ect the evoluƟ on of ECFA 
and its capacity to help avert military confl ict? Common insƟ -
tuƟ ons are certainly only beginning to relax tensions across 
the Taiwan Strait, but they appear to be slowly improving the 
prospects for peace in what had previously been considered a 
nearly intractable confl ict. 
Recognizing Two Chinas: The Puzzle around InternaƟ onal 
RecogniƟ on of Taiwan
The Taiwan impasse has problemaƟ zed internaƟ onal diplo-
macy in East Asia since the 1940s. In the last century, signifi -
cant transformaƟ ons have occurred in the region: Taiwan, the 
poliƟ cally ambiguous enƟ ty of 22 million, has democraƟ zed, 
while the People’s Republic of China (PRC) has gained increas-
ing infl uence as a formidable poliƟ cal and economic global 
power. RelaƟ ons between the PRC and the Republic of China 
on Taiwan (ROCOT) have been parƟ cularly unstable during this 
period, especially due to Taiwan’s evoluƟ on away from the 
“one-China principle” in response to local calls for self-deter-
minaƟ on and increased internaƟ onal recogniƟ on. This essay 
quesƟ ons why states choose to off er varying levels of interna-
Ɵ onal recogniƟ on to Taiwan, and what these moƟ ves suggest 
regarding the eff ecƟ veness of Taiwan foreign policy decisions 
at the moment. I argue that states maintain offi  cial and non-
offi  cial relaƟ ons with Taiwan for a number of diff erent reasons: 
economic incenƟ ves explain how Taiwan maintains offi  cial 
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recogniƟ on with a small number of states, while strategic and 
ideological imperaƟ ves are salient in the raƟ onale for sus-
tained non-offi  cial relaƟ onships with a larger number of states. 
As the economic and strategic importance of Taiwan evolves, 
especially in relaƟ on to China, the enƟ ty may fi nd it more ef-
fecƟ ve to change its internaƟ onal strategies and solely pursue 
para-diplomaƟ c relaƟ ons, while maintaining and promoƟ ng 
its unique status as a democraƟ c and economically signifi cant 
Asian enƟ ty.
 I extend the tradiƟ onal meaning of para-diplomaƟ c 
relaƟ ons to account for the unique nature of the ROCOT’s 
internaƟ onal relaƟ onships. As used here, it refers not only to 
internaƟ onal relaƟ ons conducted by subnaƟ onal, regional, 
local or non-central governments on their own to promote 
their interests outside of tradiƟ onal inter-state diplomaƟ c 
mechanisms, but also cross-border poliƟ cal acƟ viƟ es by the 
governments of poliƟ es whose internaƟ onal status is disputed 
or does not easily fi t the standard internaƟ onal legal defi niƟ on 
of a state. When states choose to pursue para-diplomaƟ c rela-
Ɵ ons with the ROCOT, they are not necessarily recognizing it 
as a state. The government of the ROCOT currently does make 
actual gains by building such unoffi  cial economic and cultural 
Ɵ es with other governments at various levels. This paper 
argues that it would gain by increasing these types of interna-
Ɵ onal relaƟ onships.
 The act of internaƟ onal recogniƟ on is signifi cant as 
it serves as an explicit indicator of external legiƟ macy (Rich 
2009: 162). This is in contrast to internal claims to sovereignty, 
based on de facto statehood as defi ned in the Montevideo 
ConvenƟ on of 1933. The Montevideo ConvenƟ on, the most 
authoritaƟ ve declaraƟ on on the factors relevant to de facto 
statehood, requires a permanent populaƟ on, defi ned territory, 
eff ecƟ ve and legiƟ mate government and the ability to enter 
into relaƟ ons with other states (Chen and Reisman 1972: 607; 
Yahuda 1996: 1323). The majority of internaƟ onal legal schol-
ars agree that Taiwan meets the qualifi caƟ ons for statehood. 
As Lung-Chu Chen states, “judged by the internaƟ onal legal 
standard of statehood, Taiwan is a sovereign, independent 
state in every sense of the word” (quoted in Shen 2000: 1125; 
see also Yahuda 1996: 1319-1323). However, the extension 
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of external legiƟ macy is subject to the calculaƟ ons and inter-
ests of individual states (Swaine 2004: 47). Taiwan has been 
successful in achieving only limited internaƟ onal recogniƟ on; 
it has developed offi  cial diplomaƟ c relaƟ ons with 22 states, 
while developing over 160 para-diplomaƟ c relaƟ onships 
(Yahuda 1996: 1323). Prior to the People’s Republic of China’s 
rapid economic and poliƟ cal rise in power, Taiwan was more 
widely recognized. In the period following World War II, the 
majority of states and great powers extended recogniƟ on to 
Taiwan by recognizing the ROC’s leadership and sovereignty 
over all of China (Payne and Veney 2001: 438). Maintaining an 
internaƟ onal presence in the current global context, however, 
involves high-cost policies for Taiwan, outside of tradiƟ onal 
state-to-state diplomaƟ c channels (ibid.).
 As explained previously, Taiwan only maintains of-
fi cial state relaƟ ons with 22 states, all of which are small and 
the vast majority of which are in the developing world. Taylor 
(2002: 125), Yahuda (1996: 1331) and Shen (2000: 1121) de-
scribe the economic imperaƟ ves present in these relaƟ onships 
as “dollar diplomacy”. These same authors note that it is the 
convergence of Taiwan’s economic strength and the devel-
oping world’s economic vulnerability that have engendered 
opportuniƟ es for Taiwan to gain diplomaƟ c recogniƟ on. One 
offi  cial even suggested that “Taipei could purchase recogniƟ on 
from a Third World country for about US $20 million” (Rich 
2009: 172; see also Payne and Veney 2001: 438-443). How-
ever, recogniƟ on based on monetary imperaƟ ves is neither 
stable nor necessarily favourable for Taiwan. Taiwan’s aƩ empt 
to maintain allies through conƟ nued economic support has 
essenƟ ally allowed the enƟ ty to be blackmailed. China has also 
recently become willing to off er similar aid packages, lead-
ing states to bargain their recogniƟ on in order to aƩ ract more 
substanƟ al economic support from each state (Rich 2009: 173, 
179). Payne and Veney argue that as China’s economy conƟ n-
ues to grow, Taiwan’s ability to use its economic might as le-
verage for internaƟ onal recogniƟ on will likely diminish (Payne 
and Veney 2001: 44).
 In regards to recogniƟ on from great power states, 
strategic and ideological imperaƟ ves are paramount (Rich 
2009: 159). While support for the naƟ onal Chinese leadership 
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that was eventually led by Chiang Kai-shek in Taiwan pre-dates 
the Cold War, it was strengthened through Cold War alliances 
rooted in the global fi ght to contain the spread of communism 
(Chen and Reisman 1972: 615). However, with fears about the 
possibility of nuclear confl ict over the island of Taiwan and the 
increased importance of China, many states reopened diplo-
maƟ c relaƟ ons with the PRC. The democraƟ zaƟ on and liberal-
izaƟ on of Taiwan has resulted in a new rhetoric, while states 
nonetheless off er limited support for the enƟ ty (Bergsten et 
al. 2008). In fact, the George W. Bush administraƟ on claimed 
that the US was obligated to “defend democracy in Taiwan” 
(Kan 2011: 2), while leaders who support China have oŌ en 
been criƟ cized for “appeasing a dictatorship at the expense 
of Taiwan’s democracy” (ibid.: 12; see also Rich 2009: 170). 
However, and especially since the end of the Cold War, ideo-
logical reasoning for maintaining Ɵ es with Taiwan have only 
held limited infl uence. In fact, Taiwan had the most support in 
the 1940s and 1950s (Tu 1996: 1122), while under the leader-
ship of the naƟ onalist Chinese reign that declared marƟ al law 
and was responsible for the “brutal massacre ... of as many 
as 20,000 Formosan [Taiwanese] leaders”, a decidedly anƟ -
liberal period (Chen and Reisman 1972: 612; Rich 2009: 178). 
Therefore, in many cases, strategic factors provide a beƩ er 
explanaƟ on for conƟ nued, if limited, internaƟ onal recogniƟ on 
of Taiwan. Swaine outlines two strategic reasons for conƟ n-
ued support using the US as a case study: conƟ nued support 
is integral to the credibility and reputaƟ on of American com-
mitments to its other allies (Swaine 2004: 43), while Taiwan’s 
economic achievements are also signifi cant and Ɵ ed to US 
trade and exports.2 However, with the increased strategic im-
portance of the PRC, global powers conƟ nue to emphasize the 
limits to internaƟ onal support for Taiwan, staƟ ng publicly and 
repeatedly that they do not support Taiwanese independence 
(Bergsten et al. 2008).
 Despite the costliness of Taiwan eff orts to gain offi  cial 
internaƟ onal recogniƟ on, this conƟ nues to be a priority on its 
foreign policy agenda. Taiwan maintains its claims for recogni-
Ɵ on based on the fact that the state meets all qualifi caƟ ons for 
de facto statehood, its populaƟ on’s right to self-determinaƟ on 
(Tu 1996: 1117) as well as the strategic desire to overcome 
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negaƟ ve consequences accrued from the enƟ ty’s lack of 
internaƟ onal status. For example, unrecognized governments 
may have diffi  culty collecƟ ng on internaƟ onal debt obliga-
Ɵ ons and regulaƟ ng foreign investments, while Taiwan has 
also been barred from internaƟ onal organizaƟ ons and from 
concluding treaƟ es (Davis 1990: 146; Shen 2000: 1124; Yahuda 
1996: 1328; Rich 2009: 171). However, China “vehemently 
opposes dual recogniƟ on” of both the ROCOT and PRC (Payne 
and Veney 2001: 446), since the Taiwan issue is perceived to 
be inextricably related to naƟ onal respect and regime survival. 
Swaine argues that Beijing regards the eventual reunifi caƟ on 
of China and Taiwan as essenƟ al to China’s “recovery from a 
century of naƟ onal weakness, vulnerability, and humiliaƟ on, as 
well as to its emergence as a respected great power” (Swaine 
2004: 40). Moreover, the independence of a single region has 
the potenƟ al to set a dangerous precedent in the PRC (Swaine 
2004: 41). As economic strategies for offi  cial relaƟ ons become 
controversially costly and unsustainable, the Taiwanese popu-
laƟ on should quesƟ on whether it is strategic for their leader-
ship to conƟ nue to seek offi  cial recogniƟ on. Instead, Taiwan 
could focus on strengthening its commitment to democracy 
and economic growth, thereby maintaining the factors that 
aƩ ract unoffi  cial para-diplomaƟ c internaƟ onal relaƟ onships. 
These relaƟ onships can be as fruiƞ ul as offi  cial relaƟ onships, 
but are less controversial for states also interested in a rela-
Ɵ onship with the PRC (see Yahuda 1996).
Taiwan’s PoliƟ cal Future in the Post-Cold War Era
Siƫ  ng at the intersecƟ on of a criƟ cal global confl ict between 
the United States and the People’s Republic of China, Taiwan 
today faces increasing challenges from Beijing’s reunifi caƟ on 
pressures. With the end of the Cold War and the economic 
rise of a globally engaged China, the raƟ onale for Taiwan’s ef-
forts to determine its own future has diminished, and, simul-
taneously, the internaƟ onal community’s aƫ  tude towards 
“Taiwan’s naƟ onal autonomy” has undergone signifi cant 
changes over the past two decades. Moreover, Taiwan’s recent 
economic decline and China’s rapid internaƟ onal expansion 
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have leŌ  the island “more suscepƟ ble to reunifi caƟ on being 
imposed by peaceful means than at any Ɵ me since de-recogni-
Ɵ on” (Allen 2003: 25). At the same Ɵ me, the danger of risking 
direct confl ict with the rapidly militarizing China and the de-
clining strategic importance of Taiwan in the post-Cold War era 
increasingly encourages Washington and its allies to consider 
backing away from their earlier commitments in Taiwan and 
to accommodate Beijing’s interests over the island instead. 
Simply put, in the newly emerging post-Cold War poliƟ cal and 
economic global order, Taiwan’s economic signifi cance and 
poliƟ cal advocacy alone are no longer enough to jusƟ fy defy-
ing Beijing’s resolute pursuit of its consƟ tuƟ onally enshrined 
goal of “reunifi caƟ on” (Rigger 2011: 189). The purpose of this 
paper, therefore, is to explore the poliƟ cal future of Taiwan in 
the context of the contemporary post-Cold War world order. 
In parƟ cular, it discusses several potenƟ al scenarios regarding 
the nature of Taiwan’s future poliƟ cal status. 
 There are three scenarios for Taiwan’s potenƟ al poliƟ -
cal status in the new world order: (1) moving toward formal 
independence from China; (2) seeking de jure reunifi caƟ on 
with China; and (3) maintaining the status quo via a two-track 
approach. This paper idenƟ fi es the third scenario—the con-
Ɵ nuaƟ on of the status quo—as the most desirable and realisƟ c 
opƟ on for Taiwan.
 Under such a scenario, Taiwan would conƟ nue pursu-
ing its current policy of maintaining the status quo, but would 
also newly adopt a two-track approach: on the one hand it 
would try to maintain stable relaƟ ons with China via exten-
sive cross-strait exchanges and Ɵ es, and, on the other hand, it 
would conƟ nue to pursue informal contacts with other coun-
tries in order to remain as a parƟ ally recognized actor in the 
internaƟ onal system—even if not an independent sovereign 
state in the foreseeable future. DomesƟ cally, Taiwan would 
largely refrain from deliberately promoƟ ng asserƟ ve naƟ on-
alism, but it would not in any way constrain the conƟ nued 
emergence of a localized Taiwanese idenƟ ty.
 This scenario, despite its ambiguous nature, is the most 
desirable and realisƟ c opƟ on for Taiwan for two reasons. First, 
it is in Taiwan’s best interest to avoid escalaƟ ng tensions with 
Beijing. In fact, considering China’s rapid internaƟ onal expan-
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sion and the “marked decline of US support for the island’s 
freedom”, Taiwan should conƟ nue to follow the current policy 
of reassurance and fl exibility on cross-strait relaƟ ons that 
would put Beijing at ease (SuƩ er 2011: 4-14). In parƟ cular, Tai-
wan should promote more extensive economic and social Ɵ es 
across the strait, largely as a means to reduce the likelihood 
of military confl ict with China. As Kastner notes, the growing 
economic Ɵ es and interdependence would, over Ɵ me, have a 
“transformaƟ ve eff ect” on the cross-strait relaƟ onship—that 
is, “ciƟ zens on either side of the Taiwan Strait may start to 
idenƟ fy more with one another as contacts between the two 
socieƟ es conƟ nue to increase” (Kastner 2009: 126). This, in 
turn, would reduce the volaƟ lity of the highly naƟ onalisƟ c 
Chinese public and, thus, reduce the domesƟ c pressure that 
Beijing faces with regards to its handling of the Taiwan issue. 
Consequently, Beijing’s stance on Taiwan would become more 
paƟ ent and fl exible.
 Second, it is also in Taiwan’s best interest to resist 
reunifi caƟ on pressures from China. Considering the highly 
centralized and authoritarian nature of China’s poliƟ cal sys-
tem, in fact, it is highly unlikely that Taiwan would be able to 
remain as a truly autonomous administraƟ ve region if reunifi -
caƟ on occurred. Rather, similar to what some analysts argue 
is already the case for Hong Kong, the Politburo of the Chi-
nese Communist Party and the Central Military Commission 
would gradually become the de facto ruling authoriƟ es over 
the island, relegaƟ ng the current Taiwanese government to a 
mere local government (Chung 2001: 237). At the same Ɵ me, 
should Taipei seek de jure reunifi caƟ on with Beijing, Taiwan 
would have to sever its offi  cial diplomaƟ c relaƟ ons with the 23 
countries with which it currently has offi  cial diplomaƟ c rela-
Ɵ ons, even though it may sƟ ll be able to maintain informal 
poliƟ cal Ɵ es and contacts with the other countries. This would 
make Taiwan substanƟ ally more vulnerable to Beijing’s poten-
Ɵ al military intervenƟ on in the cases of anƟ -Beijing protests 
or pro-secession demonstraƟ ons. In fact, it would be much 
easier for Beijing to send in its military to an internaƟ onally 
isolated territory over which it now has de jure sovereignty. 
Such a possibility threatens the conƟ nuity of the relaƟ vely 
young democraƟ c system in Taiwan and the protecƟ on of the 
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new Taiwanese idenƟ ty. Simply put, in the event of de jure 
reunifi caƟ on with China, Taiwan would lose its current status 
as a parƟ ally recognized actor in the internaƟ onal system and, 
ulƟ mately, its capacity for self-determinaƟ on. Thus, Taiwan 
should conƟ nue exercising its informal diplomacy to maintain 
its economic strength and to minimize various barriers that 
the Chinese government imposes on its ability to parƟ cipate 
in formal diplomaƟ c relaƟ ons—both of which are crucial for 
Taiwan’s conƟ nued survival as a de facto independent enƟ ty. 
In parƟ cular, Taiwan should conƟ nue pursuing its strategy of 
promoƟ ng democracy and human welfare to “aƩ ract inter-
naƟ onal (western) recogniƟ on and support in circumvenƟ ng 
Beijing’s growing infl uence in world aff airs” (Chung 2001: 240). 
At the same Ɵ me, Taiwan should also gradually promote its 
strengthened local Taiwanese idenƟ ty as a means further to 
jusƟ fy internaƟ onally its claim to a right to funcƟ on autono-
mously in internaƟ onal aff airs.
Cross-Strait Tourism: Moving People, Moving Money 
Taiwan opened its doors to our Young Leaders DelegaƟ on in 
May 2012, off ering generous hospitality as we learned about 
its poliƟ cs, economy and culture. We had discussions with pol-
iƟ cians, business people and academics, and freely exchanged 
ideas with university students at NaƟ onal Chengchi University 
and diplomats-in-training at the Foreign Service InsƟ tute. In 
many ways, our trip was a microcosm of a larger trend. Since 
President Ma Ying-jeou’s victory in 2008, Taiwan has opened 
its doors to its giant neighbour, China; men and women from 
the mainland have eagerly visited this island. Though less 
formal and educaƟ on-focused than our trip, the Chinese in 
Taiwan are engaging in cross-cultural dialogue that will hope-
fully lead to beƩ er understanding between the two countries, 
greater cross-strait cooperaƟ on and the peaceful resoluƟ on of 
decades-old problems. Facing heavy opposiƟ on from the op-
posiƟ on DemocraƟ c Progressive Party (DPP) and the Taiwan-
ese public, the Kuomintang (KMT) government claims that this 
iniƟ aƟ ve is primarily business-moƟ vated—“economics fi rst, 
poliƟ cs later,” as the saying goes (Liu 2012). But the quesƟ on 
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remains whether economic gain can galvanize the two coun-
tries into engaging in a meaningful dialogue about some of 
their larger problems.
 Taiwan has implemented a balanced foreign policy that 
refl ects the preference of the vast majority of the Taiwanese 
for the status quo—neither immediate independence nor 
unifi caƟ on with China (Want China Times). Like a good host-
ess, Taiwan welcomes you to her home, but does not smother 
you with aff ecƟ on. It has taken over half a century for Taiwan 
to permit Chinese visitors. Between 2008 and 2011, the only 
way for Chinese to visit was in a Ɵ ghtly controlled tour group, 
limiƟ ng the interacƟ on between Chinese and local Taiwanese. 
That changed in 2011. The KMT government decided to allow 
a limited number of Chinese tourists to come to the country 
unescorted (Foster 2011). While the condiƟ ons for travel are 
stringent, on any given day, 500 mainland tourists can de-
scend on Taiwan, free to go anywhere and interact with any-
one (ibid). From the onset, tourism has helped to change the 
dynamics between the Taiwanese and Chinese. Erika Guan, a 
Beijing resident, once thought that the Taiwanese were ram-
buncƟ ous, having seen poliƟ cians brawl in the legislature on 
television. But aŌ er visiƟ ng Taiwan, she now thinks that they 
are “really harmonious” (Mishkin 2012).
 In many ways, President Ma is correct that economics 
is fueling this cross-strait exchange of people, ideas, experi-
ences and values (Liu 2012). Despite some reservaƟ ons, most 
Taiwanese support President Ma’s policies on China because 
they believe that Taiwan will gain economically. By 2013, 
mainland tourism will inject US $330 billion into the Taiwan-
ese economy yearly (Jacobs 2011). Just as the mainland Chi-
nese have started to eclipse Japanese as the biggest source of 
tourism to Taiwan, China has also eclipsed Japan as Taiwan’s 
biggest trading partner (Foster 2011). With the signing of the 
Economic CooperaƟ on Framework Agreement (ECFA) in 2010, 
which reduced tariff s and commercial barriers between China 
and Taiwan, this hardly comes as a surprise (ECFA 2010). Trade 
liberalizaƟ on has already occurred in a number of industries 
as part of ECFA’s ‘Early Harvest’ period. For instance, machine 
tool exports to China skyrocketed by 62 percent and agri-
cultural exports quadrupled in the fi rst eight months of the 
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agreement (Kwong 2011). Though the ‘Early Harvest’ period 
concerns less privileged sectors (raw materials, downstream 
industrial products, etc.), ECFA certainly has the potenƟ al to 
grow. 
 Indeed, the future promises greater economic coop-
eraƟ on between Taiwan and mainland China, especially if the 
KMT stays in power. As ECFA expands, it will be applicable to 
more and more industries, such as banking (ECFA 2010). The 
late August 2012 announcement by China and Taiwan that 
they are creaƟ ng a Yuan clearing mechanism aƩ ests to this (Liu 
and Poon 2012). With a new swap line for the Yuan and New 
Taiwan dollar and a new off shore Yuan spot rate for Taiwan, 
China has given Taiwan banks the same advantages as their 
Hong Kong and Macau counterparts (ibid). Greater access to 
the Chinese Yuan would facilitate trade, as currency seƩ le-
ments would no longer have to take place in Hong Kong (ibid).
 Although more money and more people are crossing 
Taiwanese and Chinese borders, there remains a sense of wari-
ness between the two countries not easily fi xed by economic 
policy alone. The Taiwanese media gleefully report incidents of 
mainland tourists behaving badly (Jacobs 2011). Complaining 
about how Chinese visitors throw cigareƩ e buƩ s in Taroko Na-
Ɵ onal Park, Kao Hui-ch’iao, a volunteer tour guide, concludes 
woefully: “They think they know beƩ er and just don’t like 
following the rules… They just aren’t very civilized” (ibid). The 
other side shares similar senƟ ments. “It’s hard to compare any 
place to Beijing, the home of emperors,” Li Guihong, a reƟ red 
government employee, rather smugly on his inaugural trip to 
Taiwan, is reported as saying (ibid). Given the recent histories 
on both sides of the strait, this deeply entrenched sense of 
suspicion may take years to ameliorate. 
 A tradiƟ onal Chinese fable may paint a picture of the 
future. There once lived two brothers. The elder brother ran 
off  with riches, leaving his young brother impoverished and 
embiƩ ered. Decades later, aŌ er the bereŌ  brother grew richer 
and his anger faded, their grandchildren were fi nally reunited. 
The grandchildren acknowledged their diff erences, but also 
their similariƟ es, including an uƩ er disinterest in keeping up 
the feud (ibid). 
 It may be that the Taiwanese and Chinese are at the 
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point where they can cooperate for economic gain, but they 
sƟ ll struggle to put aside their cultural diff erences. It is easier 
for President Ma and future presidents to cite economic 
reasons for bringing Taiwan closer to China. No amount of 
trade, however, can fi x relaƟ ons completely at this moment. 
Nevertheless, the fable suggests that their grandchildren may 
play together one day. To make this a reality, China and Taiwan 
need to conƟ nue to encourage free and open cultural ex-
changes, namely moving people as well as moving money.
Taiwan: Establishing a DisƟ nct IdenƟ ty in Cross-Strait Rela-
Ɵ ons
Since the late twenƟ eth century, Taiwan has made signifi cant 
poliƟ cal and economic changes that have made it one of the 
most successful socieƟ es internaƟ onally. The shiŌ  from an 
underdeveloped state to a blossoming high-technology capital 
has warranted signifi cant internaƟ onal aƩ enƟ on. With trans-
formaƟ ve poliƟ cal shiŌ s that propagated democraƟ zaƟ on, as 
well as economic strengths that enabled penetraƟ on into the 
world market, Taiwan has notably benefi Ʃ ed from the process-
es of globalizaƟ on. Much of this growth stems from economic 
developments that have facilitated Taiwan’s success through-
out the late twenƟ eth century and into the twenty-fi rst centu-
ry. These developments have not only brought economic and 
poliƟ cal growth, but have also contributed to the evoluƟ on of 
Taiwan’s unique idenƟ ty. Flourishing from a former colony to 
a democraƟ zed economic powerhouse, it is evident in Taiwan 
today that these developments have encouraged the island’s 
growth and its recogniƟ on as an internaƟ onal actor. This paper 
suggests that economic and poliƟ cal developments made in 
Taiwan conƟ nue to contribute to the growth of its disƟ nct 
idenƟ ty, which steadily drives Taiwan towards sovereignty.
 Although Taiwan is a former colony, its people have 
been able to make signifi cant transformaƟ ons throughout 
the twenƟ eth century that redefi ned the island’s idenƟ ty and 
established its de facto poliƟ cal autonomy from mainland 
China. Further changes during a poliƟ cal wave of liberaliza-
Ɵ on and democraƟ zaƟ on enabled ciƟ zens to vote, publicly 
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express themselves and hold local government accountable 
(Wu 2007: 984). While these changes have been benefi cial for 
Taiwan, it is important to note that they have oŌ en insƟ gated 
tensions with mainland China. Despite these tensions, Tai-
wan’s revoluƟ onary changes not only empowered ciƟ zens and 
strengthened their sense of having a disƟ nct idenƟ ty, it also 
disƟ nguished Taiwan from the rest of Asia, which conƟ nues to 
be emphasized today. During this Ɵ me, poliƟ cal parƟ es such 
as the DemocraƟ c Progressive Party (DPP) conƟ nued to trans-
form the poliƟ cal agenda by pushing for greater democraƟ za-
Ɵ on, social welfare and recogniƟ on of Taiwan as a sovereign 
state (DemocraƟ c Progressive Party 2012). More recently, the 
Kuomintang (KMT) has aƩ empted to stabilize Taiwan’s rela-
Ɵ onship with China by establishing peaceful dialogue through 
iniƟ aƟ ves such as the Economic CooperaƟ on Framework 
Agreement, in order to strengthen cross-strait relaƟ ons (Saun-
ders and Kastner 2009: 87). While some Taiwanese worry this 
relaƟ onship could be detrimental to Taiwan’s disƟ nct idenƟ ty 
and autonomy, local populaƟ ons are increasingly recognizing 
themselves as Taiwanese instead of Chinese. This has become 
evident in the last decade, with an increase from 36 percent 
in 2000 to 52.7 percent in 2010 of individuals who idenƟ fi ed 
themselves as Taiwanese (ElecƟ on Study Center. NaƟ onal 
Chengchi University. 2011). Therefore, despite concerns 
regarding cross-strait relaƟ ons with China, Taiwan’s poliƟ cal 
autonomy and growing self idenƟ fi caƟ on suggests that cross-
strait relaƟ ons pose liƩ le threat to Taiwan’s disƟ nct idenƟ ty. 
Thus, despite experiencing tension with mainland China, Tai-
wan’s current relaƟ onship with mainland China is more ame-
nable now than in previous decades as poliƟ cal change and 
democraƟ zaƟ on have opened discourse to pursue an advanta-
geous relaƟ onship for both socieƟ es which has, at the same 
Ɵ me, also strengthened Taiwan’s disƟ ncƟ veness.
 However, it was not solely poliƟ cal shiŌ s, but also eco-
nomic transformaƟ ons that have contributed to the success 
and idenƟ fi caƟ on of Taiwan’s idenƟ ty. During this Ɵ me of in-
tense global interdependence and market compeƟ Ɵ on, Taiwan 
was able to shiŌ  its economy from labour-intensive producƟ on 
to manufacturing while also being introduced to internaƟ onal 
opportuniƟ es (Tsai, Lee and Wang 2006: 284). The signifi cance 
... Taiwan’s poliƟ cal autonomy and 
growing self idenƟ fi caƟ on suggests 
that cross-strait relaƟ ons pose liƩ le 
threat to Taiwan’s disƟ nct idenƟ ty.
Asia Colloquia Papers
26
Vol. 2 No. 2 // November 2012
… Taiwan’s means of providing 
conƟ nued economic security to 
the populaƟ on, may also act as 
a means to eventually achieve 
naƟ onal recogniƟ on.
of Taiwan’s growth was witnessed in GNP per capita growth 
from US $50 in 1950 to US $13,325 in 2000 (Ku 2002: 59). The 
benefi ts of this success are signifi cant amongst the Taiwanese 
populaƟ on, which has experienced a rise in the standard of 
living along with increased educaƟ on and literacy rates (Tsai, 
Lee, and Wang 2006: 277, 284). As well, it has brought greater 
rural economic integraƟ on and reduced unemployment rates 
by over half (Ku 2002: 59). It is these economic developments 
that played an integral part not only in the economic growth 
of Taiwan, but also in the social growth of the populace, which 
helped shape Taiwan’s unique idenƟ ty from the rest of Asia.
 Yet, despite these developments, Taiwan’s growth is 
becoming stagnant (see CIA 2012). In order to ensure con-
Ɵ nued growth and development, Taiwan has moved towards 
strengthening cross-strait relaƟ ons, both poliƟ cal and econom-
ic, but especially the laƩ er. While some in Taiwan, specifi cally 
businesses, regard this as an opportunity to negoƟ ate poliƟ cal 
agreements and increase profi table business prospects, others 
worry this relaƟ onship may become hazardous by creaƟ ng an 
overdependence on China’s economy, or fail to provide the 
Taiwanese populaƟ on with a favourable outcome. Many sƟ ll 
regard China as a threatening neighbour. SƟ ll, an overwhelm-
ing 80 percent of Taiwanese people believe cross-strait rela-
Ɵ ons must be maintained in order to uphold the economic sta-
tus quo. The ideal here is to maintain poliƟ cal distance, while 
supporƟ ng economic cooperaƟ on and integraƟ on (Keng and 
Schubert 2010: 288). This suggests that many believe greater 
economic integraƟ on and poliƟ cal cooperaƟ on with China will 
not necessarily threaten Taiwan’s survival as a disƟ nct society. 
It suggests that in the minds of some Taiwanese people, great-
er integraƟ on could bring increased recogniƟ on of Taiwan’s 
disƟ nct idenƟ ty by mainland China, which would be favourable 
in Chinese discussions pertaining to Taiwan’s idenƟ ty and sov-
ereignty (Keng and Schubert 2010: 310). Therefore, Taiwan’s 
means of providing conƟ nued economic security to the popu-
laƟ on, may also act as a means to eventually achieve naƟ onal 
recogniƟ on.
 To conclude, Taiwan has successfully transformed 
poliƟ cally and economically to create a unique idenƟ ty in Asia. 
Its economic transformaƟ ons and poliƟ cal shiŌ s have provided 
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greater opportunity for poliƟ cal parƟ cipaƟ on through demo-
craƟ c elecƟ ons and a greater enjoyment of other rights and 
freedoms, as well as a growing consciousness amongst Taiwan-
ese people that they have an idenƟ ty disƟ nct from that of Chi-
na. Despite some contenƟ ous poliƟ cal changes and economic 
stagnaƟ on, Taiwan’s move towards strengthening cross-strait 
relaƟ ons may prove benefi cial and contribute to the idenƟ fi ca-
Ɵ on of Taiwan’s collecƟ ve idenƟ ty both locally and internaƟ on-
ally. These developments are recognizable today as Taiwan 
conƟ nues to fl ourish in the twenty-fi rst century and progresses 
towards greater self-idenƟ fi caƟ on by the Taiwan populaƟ on, 
as well as recogniƟ on by China and on a wider internaƟ onal 
scale.
Taiwan and the Cross-Straits Economic Co-operaƟ on             
Framework Agreement
Taiwan uniquely experiences the major implicaƟ ons of a 
changing global poliƟ cal and economic order where the devel-
oping BRICS countries are gaining power. This is primarily due 
to Taiwan’s complicated relaƟ onship with China (the People’s 
Republic of China, hereaŌ er PRC or China), which is among the 
most prominent of the BRICS countries. China claims Taiwan 
as part of its state. This claim has been reifi ed in the adopƟ on 
of a “one-China principle”, where China asserts its sovereignty 
over Taiwan, which it sees as part of PRC territory (Taiwan 
Aff airs Offi  ce. State Council, People’s Republic of China 2000: 
1-2).
 Historically, the “one-China principle” has been pur-
sued by China through the strategic isolaƟ on of Taiwan in of-
fi cial government relaƟ ons within mulƟ naƟ onal organizaƟ ons 
and in bilateral relaƟ ons with other countries. For example, 
Taiwan has been prevented from becoming a full-fl edged 
member in important organizaƟ ons such as the United NaƟ ons 
and the InternaƟ onal Monetary Fund due to China’s aƩ empts 
to isolate Taiwan diplomaƟ cally.
 Nonetheless, in the period from 1983 to 2000, Taiwan 
tripled its membership in Inter-Governmental OrganizaƟ ons 
(IGOs), with a parƟ cular emphasis on economic and agricul-
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tural organizaƟ ons. Taiwan has been able to focus on organiza-
Ɵ ons that are derived from other IGOs (e.g. aƩ endance at the 
2009 World Health Assembly, the annual World Health Orga-
nizaƟ on meeƟ ng), as these organizaƟ ons oŌ en allow for more 
fl exibility in criteria for membership (Li 2006: 613).
 One region where China’s negaƟ ve infl uence on Tai-
wan’s bilateral relaƟ ons can be seen is the Caribbean. The 
PRC developed and conƟ nues to develop economic and poliƟ -
cal relaƟ ons with states such as the Bahamas, Trinidad and 
Tobago, AnƟ gua and Barbuda, Dominica and Grenada. This 
region has experienced a phenomenon of PRC economic 
“awards” granted in part simply for severing relaƟ ons with 
Taiwan. For instance, the Chinese government recently built a 
US $35 million stadium in Bahamas, which Bahamian govern-
ment offi  cials assert was largely a reward for breaking Ɵ es with 
Taiwan in 1997 and, instead, establishing Ɵ es with the main-
land (Archibold 2012). In response, the Taiwanese government 
engaged in and conƟ nues to engage in strategic economic and 
poliƟ cal relaƟ ons with specifi c Caribbean countries, including 
Belize, St. KiƩ s and Nevis, and St. Lucia (ibid.). These relaƟ ons 
ensured that Taiwan maintains a presence—however small—in 
the Caribbean. Nonetheless, a new phase of relaƟ ons between 
the PRC and Taiwan began in June 2010 with the signing of a 
bilateral free-trade agreement, the Economic Co-operaƟ on 
Framework Agreement (ECFA). A corollary of ECFA is that a de 
facto truce in the internaƟ onal diplomaƟ c baƩ le between the 
two poliƟ cal enƟ Ɵ es has been declared (“Ma’s Second Stand”, 
Economist, May 19, 2012).
 The will of the Taiwanese populaƟ on is to maintain 
the island’s survival as a poliƟ cal enƟ ty that is independent 
and disƟ nct from China while increasing bilateral economic 
relaƟ ons. Two factors demonstrate this trend. First, in 1992 
roughly a quarter of Taiwan’s populaƟ on idenƟ fi ed as Chinese, 
while in 2011 less than fi ve percent of the populaƟ on idenƟ -
fi ed as Chinese. A corresponding—although less steep—rise 
in the idenƟ fi caƟ on as Taiwanese has occurred (“Taiwan’s 
Ordinary ElecƟ on”, Wall Street Journal, January 16, 2012). The 
Taiwan idenƟ ty is markedly disƟ nct from the Chinese idenƟ ty. 
Secondly, in the economic sphere, Taipei and Beijing complet-
ed ECFA, which calls for a decrease in Chinese tariff s on Tai-
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wanese products and greater access for Taiwanese companies 
to the Chinese market. ECFA is to be implemented in incre-
mental stages over a period of years. As Shen Lyu-shu, ROC 
representaƟ ve to the United Kingdom, has asserted, Taiwan 
is capitalizing upon this agreement to posiƟ on itself on the 
global stage as “an invaluable base for accessing the mainland 
Chinese market” (Marchant 2012). As such, Taiwanese govern-
ment agencies and businesses promote the country’s close 
proximity and purportedly “inside” access to the mainland. For 
instance, Taiwan has completed 16 major agreements with the 
PRC, dealing with the likes of aviaƟ on and shipping. There are 
up to 561 direct fl ights a week between Taiwan and 41 Chinese 
ciƟ es, and Taiwanese ships have access to 68 Chinese ports 
(including 16 on the Yangtze River). Taiwan’s increasingly close 
economic Ɵ es with China are being touted as a business ad-
vantage that other countries and companies can discover for 
their benefi t (Marchant 2012). The desire to maintain poliƟ cal 
independence from China while strengthening economic rela-
Ɵ ons must be delicately balanced.
 Taiwan needs to exploit its economic and technological 
prowess to develop bilateral strategic trading relaƟ ons which 
its trading partners deem as important for their own interests.  
Such a strategy ensures external support of Taiwan’s poliƟ cal 
autonomy while it charts untested territory by forging deeper 
economic Ɵ es with China. Taiwan is currently negoƟ aƟ ng a 
free-trade agreement with Singapore—expected to be com-
pleted in 2013—and plans are underway to negoƟ ate similar 
agreements with New Zealand and potenƟ ally India and Indo-
nesia (“Ma’s Second Stand”, Economist, May 19, 2012). Tai-
wan’s economy emphasizes trading, as three-quarters of Tai-
wan’s GDP is due to exports of sophisƟ cated electronic parts 
and products as well as petrochemicals (“Taiwan’s ordinary 
elecƟ on”, Wall Street Journal, January 16, 2012). Taiwan needs 
to leverage its advanced industries in order to culƟ vate new 
potenƟ al allies who are powerful enough and fi nd it in their 
strategic interests to facilitate Taiwan’s de facto independence. 
Taiwan’s ability to adapt and innovate in an era of changing 
global poliƟ cal and economic centers of power is important for 
maintaining the island’s autonomy.
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